Descartes argues that since there are no certain marks to distinguish waking experiences from dreams, we need to justify our belief that waking experiences are veridical experiences of physical objects while dreams are illusions. He resolves this problem by arguing that the absence of marks distinguishing dreams from waking experiences notwithstanding, we are justified in ascribing different cognitive values to waking experiences and dreams. For, our belief in God rules out any other explanation of the agreement of all our faculties (...) in supporting the instinctive belief that waking experiences are caused by physical objects. (shrink)

Descartes argues that since there are no certain marks to distinguish waking experiences from dreams, we need to justify our belief that waking experiences are veridical experiences of physical objects while dreams are illusions. He resolves this problem by arguing that the absence of marks distinguishing dreams from waking experiences notwithstanding, we are justified in ascribing different cognitive values to waking experiences and dreams. For, our belief in God rules out any other explanation of the agreement of all our faculties (...) in supporting the instinctive belief that waking experiences are caused by physical objects. (shrink)

CUPRINS CONTUR Re-Introducere, sau: Dincolo de „teoria şi practica” informării şi documentării – Spre o hermeneutică necesară Viorica Sâncrăian Atelier Philobiblon FOCUS Gheroghe Vais Biblioteca Universităţii din Cluj, 1906-1909 Dénes Győrfi Gyalui Farkas – fost director adjunct al bibliotecii universităţii din Cluj Vladimir F. Wertsman Seria filatelică multiculturală Librariana Meda-Diana Hotea „O scriere chineză în cifre arabe” Carmen Crişan Utilizarea bazelor de date ştiinţifice abonate de Biblioteca Centrala Universitara Lucian Blaga în anul 2005 Gabriela Morărescu Anul 2005 – (...) o nouă abordare a bibliotecilor filiale Mariana Falup Realizări şi perspective în automatizare şi modernizare Maria Petrescu Digitizarea documentelor culturale Alina Ioana Şuta De la schimbul internaţional de publicaţii la schimbul experienţei – un contact polonez Marcela-Georgeta Groza Biblioteca de Matematică şi Informatică între ieri şi mâine Luminiţa Tomuţa Remodelarea unei biblioteci – Remodelarea mentalităţilor Emilia-Maria Soporan O prietenie activă pe tărâmul multiculturalităţii: Andrei Pippidi - Adrian Marino Costel Dumitraşcu Informaţiile bibliografice sau: Pe urmele cărţii în bibliotecă ORIZONTURI Pavel Puşcaş Astrolabium Ioan Mihai Cochinescu Alchimia şi muzica Alin Mihai Gherman Muzică şi literatură – Aproximaţii şi însemnări ale unui meloman înrăit Monica Gheţ Muzica împotriva ciumei Florina Iliş Adrian Marino şi ideea de literatură din perspectivă hermeneutică Rodica Frenţiu Tatakau Hikaku Bungaku – Adrian Marino şi comparatismul militant în Japonia Mariana Soporan Fondul arhivistic Adrian Marino din Biblioteca Centrală Universitară „Lucian Blaga” Gábor Győrffy Adrian Marino: alternativa autohtonă a culturii libere Sidonia Grama Între spaţii ale amintirii şi locuri ale memoriei – Comemorarea a 15 ani de la revoluţie în Timişoara REFLEXII Ioana Robu- Sally Wood-Lamont Cea de-a 10-a Conferinţă a Asociaţiei Europene pentru Informare şi Biblioteci Medicale (EAHIL) Felix Ostrovschi Un alt fel de discurs – Adrian Marino Liana Iancu Radio, presă, carte – Iancu Tiberiu – şi după Kinga Tamás Váczy Leona (1913-1995) Biblioteca, spaţiu intelectual al omului sau: Trecut pentru viitor Adrian Grănescu Emil Pintea (16 decembrie 1944 - 6 ianuarie 2004) – polivalenţa unui destin Melinda Éva Szász Pasiune pentru carte şi artă – Dénes Gábor Meda-Diana Hotea „Lumină din lumină”: primăvară pascală – Expoziţie (07 aprilie - 03 mai 2005) Kolumbán Judit Expoziţia de manuscrise de sec. XVI-XVIII în Biblioteca Centrală Universitară „Lucian Blaga” – Homo scribens: genurile memoriei si tipologia scrierii în secolele XVI-XVIII-lea (Homo scribens: emlékezéskultúra és íráshasználati-szokások a XVI-XVIII században) Meda-Diana Hotea „Cartea cărţilor” – Memoria credinţei – Expoziţie (10.02 - 25.02.2005) Raluca Soare Clădirile clujene sau martorii tăcuţi Adrian Grănescu (Despre) Managementul construcţiilor de biblioteci – recenzie şi marginalii Maria-Stela Constantinescu-Matiţa Mircea Popa: Andrei VERESS – un bibliograf maghiar, prieten al românilor (Recenzie) István Király V. Activitatea Ştiinţifică a Universităţii „Babeş-Bolyai” – 2005, sau de la povara... la demnitatea istoriei Bodnár Róbert Pe urmele unei biblioteci pierdute Raluca Soare Un om, o carte, o bibliotecă – Traian Brad, un slujitor al cărţii Ildikó Bán Lidia Kulikovski: Accesul persoanelor dezavantajate la potenţialul bibliotecilor (Manual pentru bibliotecari) Chişinău, Editura Epigraf, 2006 (Recenzie) Iacob Mârza Meda-Diana Hotea: Catalogul cărţii rare din colecţiile B. C. U. „Lucian Blaga”– Donaţia Gh. Sion Vol. I (sec. XVI-XVIII) (Recenzie) Ruxandra Cesereanu Adrian Marino între unit-ideas şi Zeitgeist Iulia Grad Filozofia evreiască: între Ierusalim şi Atena Raluca Soare De-o parte şi de alta a cărţilor Adrian Grănescu (Recenzie) Boglárka Daróczi Literatura germană pentru copii apărută în România între 1944-1989 – O bibliografie. (shrink)

Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of (...) the Cartesian view defended here is not dualism--which is not adopted--but internalism. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted externalist thesis, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on certain features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view, which holds that the mind is autonomous, and though it is obviously affected by the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. Defenders of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; Katalin Farkas offers a defence of an uncompromising internalist Cartesian conception. (shrink)

On a Cartesian conception of the mind, I could be a solitary being and still have the same mental states as I currently have. This paper asks how the lives of other people fit into this conception. I investigate the second-person perspective—thinking of others as ‘you’ while engaging in reciprocal communicative interactions with them—and argue that it is neither epistemically nor metaphysically distinctive. I also argue that the Cartesian picture explains why other people are special: because they matter not just (...) for the effect that they have on us. (shrink)

The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; (...) and that certain features of this practical knowledge-wh put pressure on the standard analysis of know-wh. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that besides knowledge of facts or truths, there is also knowledge of things–for example, we say that we know people or know places. We could call this "objectual knowledge". In this paper, I raise doubts about the idea that there is a sui generis objectual knowledge that is distinct from knowledge of truths.

In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. (...) We may ask whether this concession to content externalism is obligatory. In this paper, I shall argue that it isn’t. I shall suggest that if one is convinced that narrow phenomenal intentionality is legitimate, there is nothing stopping one from claiming that all intentionality is narrow. (shrink)

Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.

On the dust jacket of The Subject's Point of View there is a detail from Vilhelm Hammershoi's Interior with Sitting Woman. It is hard to think of a painter who better captures the inner in his work. From the monochrome colour, to the back that faces us, to the door swung open to reveal yet another doorway, we are led to interiority – to the inner. This is a perfect image for a book whose author wants to persuade us to (...) return to the interior – a Cartesian interior.The Cartesian interior has come in for quite a drubbing in philosophy for some considerable time. In the mid-to-late 1970s, a style of argument emerged, designed to challenge this conception of mind and establish in its place an externalist conception of language and of mind. One version of the argument was due to Hilary Putnam and emerged in the context of considerations concerning linguistic meaning; another was due to Tyler Burge and emerged first in the context of considerations concerning the individual in relation to his/her social environment. In his earliest paper, on this topic, Burge wrote of ‘the elderly Cartesian tradition’ where ‘the spotlight is on what exists or transpires “in” the individual – his secret cognition, his innate cognitive structures, his private perceptions and introspections, his grasping of ideas, concepts or forms’. Farkas wants to defend this ‘elderly tradition’, but she does add to it some interesting twists. First and foremost, she places to one side ideas of privacy, of incorrigibility and infallibility. She also wishes to place the issue of dualism to one side. What Farkas concentrates on is privileged access and argues that this is …. (shrink)

The focus of the original argument for the Extended Mind thesis was the case of beliefs. It may be asked what other types of mental features can be extended. Andy Clark has always held that consciousness cannot be extended. This paper revisits the question of extending consciousness.

This paper investigates the question of whether know-how can be regarded as a form of non-propositional intentionality.

International migration of work force is presently a high amplitude phenomenon. Romanian people have emigrated for work around the world, being engaged both in the physically hardest jobs and in activities that require completion of specialized courses and certification in a particular field. This last category includes social workers who, following schooling and certification and even having a minimal experience in the home country, apply for jobs in the field of social assistance. These recruiters aim to distribute social workers at (...) the workplace of interest, according to certain well-defined criteria. In the present paper we describe international migration of work force, and we illustrate it by adding case studies of life experience of social workers who underwent the process of emigration to the United Kingdom. Throughout the emigration process, these workers experienced certain changes in their life principles, mentality, values, and were marked by professional dilemmas in extreme situations. (shrink)

The present study examined the costs and benefits of native language similarity for non-native vocabulary learning. Because learning a second language is difficult, many learners start with easy words that look like their native language to jumpstart their vocabulary. However, this approach may not be the most effective strategy in the long-term, compared to introducing difficult L2 vocabulary early on. We examined how L1 orthographic typicality affects pattern learning of novel vocabulary by teaching English monolinguals either Englishlike or Non-Englishlike pseudowords (...) that contained repeated orthographic patterns. We found that overall, the first words that individuals learned during initial acquisition influenced which words they acquired later. Specifically, learning a new word in one session made it easier to acquire an orthographically similar word in the next session. Similarity among non-native words interacted with native language similarity, so that words that looked more like English were easier to learn at first, but they were less effective at influencing later word learning. This demonstrates that although native language similarity has a beneficial effect early on, it may reduce learners' ability to benefit from non-native word patterns during continued acquisition. This surprising finding demonstrates that making learning easier may not be the most effective long-term strategy. Learning difficult vocabulary teaches the learner what makes non-native words unique, and this general wordform knowledge may be more valuable than the words themselves. We conclude that native language similarity modulates new vocabulary acquisition and that difficulties during learning are not always to be avoided, as additional effort early on can pay later dividends. (shrink)

Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of indiscriminability, and for considerations (...) about the phenomenal sorites. (shrink)

The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged (...) access. (shrink)

We continue investigating variants of the splitting and reaping numbers introduced in [4]. In particular, answering a question raised there, we prove the consistency of and of. Moreover, we discuss their natural generalisations $\mathfrak {s}_{\rho }$ and $\mathfrak {r}_{\rho }$ for $\rho \in (0,1)$, and show that $\mathfrak {r}_{\rho }$ does not depend on $\rho $.

The common periodisation in Ash‘ari kalām is Ibn Khaldun's distinction between the early and late periods over al-Ghazālī. Although some consider this as an artificial and unrealistic periodisation, we do not think so. For, it is not possible to understand and make sense of the logic and necessity of periodisation without knowing what exactly distinguishes these periods from each other and what kind of great differences and changes occurred in the latter period. The most important factor that distinguishes the theological (...) activities of the two periods is undoubtedly the Peripatetic philosophy that left its mark on the second period. The direct relationship established by the Ash‘ari theologians of the late period with philosophy has been the source of many changes in theology. These changes have manifested themselves in many areas from the understanding of method in theology to the theory of definition, from the use of evidence to the theories of nature, intellect and soul, most importantly from the notion of the Omnipotent God (al-Fā‘il al-Mukhtār) to the metaphysics of possibility-necessity, and from the cosmology of substance-accident to al-umūr al-‘āmma as the main subject-matter of metaphysics. Finally, the changes in the process that started with al-Ghazālī and evolved with Fakhruddīn al-Rāzī brought theology to the brink of philosophization, and at the end of the process, theology turned into a universal (metaphysical) discipline. This situation naturally led to a convergence between the metaphysical thought and theological thought. It is one thing to say that theology is the most honourable and supreme science, and it is another to reveal that it is universal. In this context, al-Ghazālī declared and substituted the Islamic theology as a religious universal discipline for the first time. Actually, this substitution has a hidden philosophical/metaphysical meaning and message. Al-Ghazālī 's characterisation of theology as a universal science can also be interpreted as a challenge to both the sciences of the field it belongs to and the sciences outside itself, with its disciplinary encompassing and priority for theology. It should not be forgotten that theology, while confronting and coming to terms with philosophy and metaphysics, integrating with the subjects it has taken into the field of study, on the other hand, it has to maintain and protect the religious character it belongs to and represents. (shrink)

It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences (...) and the intentionality of thoughts: unlike the former, the latter is not constructed. (shrink)

Hallucinations occur in a wide range of organic and psychological disorders, as well as in a small percentage of the normal population According to usual definitions in psychology and psychiatry, hallucinations are sensory experiences which present things that are not there, but are nonetheless accompanied by a powerful sense of reality. As Richard Bentall puts it, “the illusion of reality ... is the sine qua non of all hallucinatory experiences” (Bentall 1990: 82). The aim of this paper is to find (...) out what lends an experience ‘a sense of reality’: what features are required for an experience to feel ‘real’, in the relevant sense? I will investigate the claim that phenomenological features are largely responsible for a sense of reality, and will find this claim wanting. My suggestion is that a sense of reality is created and sustained by the larger nexus of the subject's beliefs. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.

Languages that have determiners often have a rich inventory of them. In English, indefinite determiners include a(n), some, a certain, this, one, another, cardinals, partitives, the zero determiner of bare plurals (in some analyses), and, according to Horn 1999 and Giannakidou 2001, any. Despite the attention indefinites have received in the literature, characterizing what is common to all of them and what is specific to each is still an elusive task. This paper investigates the first three determiners in this list, (...) attempting to provide a semantic characterization that accounts for their distribution. (For pertinent discussion of issues that overlap to some extent with those taken up below, see Kamp and Bende-Farkas 2002, and for a discussion of the French versions of some and a certain, see Jayez and Tovena (this volume).) The Ds that concern us here share two characteristics: (i) they are indefinite, and (ii) they are existential when not in the scope of any operator or quantifier. As seen in [1], they may occur as pivots in existential there constructions, and therefore all three form weak DPs. (shrink)

Although Dirār b. ʿAmr is the most important mutakallim of the second century, he is unfortunately one of the unjustified names in the history of kalām. Dirâr is a mutakallim whose name is rarely mentioned in theological publications published in both Turkish and foreign languages until recently, and his importance and position are still not noticed. As a matter of fact, Josef van Ess and W. Montgomery Watt, who are famous orientalists, discovered this tragic fact and tried to make up (...) for this deficiency to some extent with their studies. Dirâr wrote a refutation of Aristotle's theory of substance and accident, opened a new way with his understanding of existence based on accidents and led Ash'ari with the theory of kasb and Ebu'l-Huzayl al-‘Allaf with his kalām accumulation. Undoubtedly, one of the things that makes Dirār important is that he had views that went beyond his time and caused him to contradict his contemporaries as early as the second century in terms of the history of Islamic thought. Considering the list of works that have not survived, except for one, in such a period when the mainstream sects were not yet formed and they were on the eve of their formation, Dirār was generally in a critical dialogue with the Islamic and non-Islamic movements he encountered and knew. For this reason, it is almost impossible to place him in any religious sect mentioned in his period. Because he often preferred to follow his own ideas rather than the opinions of others on many issues. Naturally, this makes it difficult to place Dirār in a certain school and frees him from all kinds of bonds. Yes, in the sources we come across many allegations, accusations and slanders that Dirār is a Cahmi/Jabri, he is a Mu‘tazili, he is an innovator with malignant ideas, he is an infidel to put a bounty on his head. Understanding the reasons for these depends on getting to know Dirār, understanding his ideas, and determining his position. If we say in the context of our study, the position of Dirār is actually a state of non-position, and we think that the concept that best expresses this situation in a new interpretation is "nawābit". In the light of our analysis, we see that, with the exception of a name, nawābit is used as a concept with a negative content and connotation in both theology and philosophy. The exceptional person is the famous philosopher Ibn Bājja (Avempace) from Andalusia, the contemporary of Ibn Rushd (Averroes). While Mu‘tazili mutakallims use nawābit to humiliate groups such as Ahl-i hadith and Hashviyye, which adopt the narration-oriented line that puts reason and acumen to the second place, Al-Fārābī also uses the fault types and the sick characters in his virtuous city that he has constructed to describe. Ibn Bājja, on the other hand, considers the people called nawābit within his project to be equivalent to the "mutawahhid" (alone human) whose "precaution" he aims; this usage which corresponds with the context of the concept in the study. Because, in our study, nawābit is not considered as an identity, but as a representation of a character. (shrink)

According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions—including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers—fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be located spatially outside the body. Once we (...) accept that the mind depends on physical events to some extent, this thesis, though not obvious, is compatible with a large variety of views on the mind. The second version applies to standing states only, and has to do with how we conceive the nature of such states. This second version is much more interesting, because it points to a potential tension in our conception of minds or selves. However, without properly distinguishing between the two theses, the significance of the second is obscured by the comparative triviality of the first. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, to explore the emotional aspects underlying classroom conflict management, and secondly, to apply these notions to the contrasted analysis of two case studies. Our findings underscore the importance of examining teachers’ emotional regulation to better understand their performance when dealing with conflicts that affect classroom climate. In the final section, we make suggestions for introducing this perspective into initial teacher training through the use of Virtual Reality, a scenario that would allow pre-service (...) teachers to experiment, record and reflect on affective and attitudinal issues that are decisive for effective classroom conflict management. (shrink)

In this chapter, I revisit the issue of the explanatory gap that is supposed to open when considering identity statements between physical and mental phenomena. I show that the question asked in the original formulation of the explanatory gap was this: ʻwhy this phenomenal character, rather than any other, is attached to this physiological process?ʼ I argue that this question can be answered, because there is a natural fit between the phenomenal character of experiences and their functional roles. For example, (...) pains feel inherently unpleasant, and that explains why they cause avoidance behaviour, and the felt location and intensity of pain indicates the location and extent of damage to the body. I discuss some other possible gaps in our understanding the relationship between the mental and the physical, and conclude that the fit between functional role and phenomenal character goes a long way, though probably not the whole way, to closing the explanatory gap. (shrink)

The aim of this series is to make exploratory work that employs new linguistic data, extending the scope or domain of current theoretical proposals, available to a wide audience. These monographs will provide an insightful generalization..

Know -wh ascriptions are ubiquitous in many languages. One standard analysis of know -wh is this: someone knows-wh just in case she knows that p, where p is an answer to the question included in the wh-clause. Additional conditions have also been proposed, but virtually all analyses assume that propositional knowledge of an answer is at least a necessary condition for knowledge-wh. This paper challenges this assumption, by arguing that there are cases where we have knowledge-wh without knowledge- that of (...) an answer, for example in the cases familiar from arguments for the Extended Mind hypothesis. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the concepts of social position and social status, the types of social position, as well as the determinedness of social statuses by the given positions in a new approach. In the first, introductory part of the article, I emphasize that the institutional sociological conception of social position in my approach is relatively closest to the structuralist position conception. In the second part, I introduce two different concepts, labelled social position and social status, and briefly review (...) the social determinedness of social status. In the third part, social positions are typified from the point of view of the two components of social position: on the one hand, from that of social power relations and on the other from that of interest relations. I point out that the different social positions promote the realization of interests to different degrees, that is, they make it possible to attain different social statuses. In a related article, I illustrate the concepts and connections in question with a case study carried out on an industrial shop floor. (shrink)

林家は、朱子学者・林羅山を始祖とする江戸幕府に仕えた儒官の家柄である。大坂冬の陣の発端となった方広寺鐘銘事件から、史書『本朝通鑑』の編纂、湯島聖堂の創建、大学頭叙任、赤穂浪士討ち入り事件への対応、そし て新井白石との対立まで―。初代羅山・二代鵞峰・三代鳳岡は、歴代将軍の寵用と冷遇に翻弄されながらも、江戸期朱子学の確立に奔走した。その林家三代一五〇年の闘いと事績を描く。.

1 The notion of specicity has played a signicant role in linguistic theory both in the elds of semantics and, increasingly, in work on syntax/semantics interface., Abbott, Kripke, Fodor and Sag, Higginbotham and Enc among many others; see also Pesetsky, Szabolcsi and Zwarts, Diesing, Dobrovie- Sorin, E. Kiss, Mahajan, and Chung for work where specicity is discussed in connection with syntactic matters.) Specicity is interesting for the student of semantics because it is crucially relevant to establishing varieties of reference. For (...) the syntactician, the notion of specicity comes up when attempting to account for the use of various case markers on DOs in languages as diverse as Romanian, Turkish, and Hindi, or when attempting to account for the full spectrum of judgments concerning weak island violations and the interpretation of multiple wh-questions. The rst point I will argue for is that there are several distinct notions of specicity that should be kept apart. More specically, I will argue that there are at least three. The discussion inevitably leads to Fodor and Sag's ambiguity claim, which in turn leads to the issue of the possible scopes of indenite noun phrases versus the possible scope of quanticational noun phrases. Section 3 will establish the relevant empirical generalizations concerning simple indenites and distributives, and Section 4 captures them within a non-congurational theory of scope proposed in Farkas and Farkas. (shrink)

Parallel language activation in bilinguals leads to competition between languages. Experience managing this interference may aid novel language learning by improving the ability to suppress competition from known languages. To investigate the effect of bilingualism on the ability to control native-language interference, monolinguals and bilinguals were taught an artificial language designed to elicit between-language competition. Partial activation of interlingual competitors was assessed with eye-tracking and mouse-tracking during a word recognition task in the novel language. Eye-tracking results showed that monolinguals looked (...) at competitors more than bilinguals, and for a longer duration of time. Mouse-tracking results showed that monolinguals’ mouse movements were attracted to native-language competitors, whereas bilinguals overcame competitor interference by increasing the activation of target items. Results suggest that bilinguals manage cross-linguistic interference more effectively than monolinguals. We conclude that language interference can affect lexical retrieval, but bilingualism may reduce this interference by facilitating access to a newly learned language. (shrink)

Descartes, one of the 17th century philosophers, likens philosophy to a tree in the context of the classification of sciences. According to him, philosophy is a tree: roots are metaphysics, body is physics and branches are medicine, mechanics and ethics. This classification is also called as the tree of philosophy and it symbolizes the scientific paradigm of the Cartesian tradition and therefore the modern philosophy in general. Descartes' famous tree was shaken with a heavy question asked three centuries later by (...) the German philosopher Heidegger. Heidegger asks the French philosopher: “What is the soil of the Philosophy tree?”. We want to go back in time before Descartes, keeping this challenging question of Heidegger and aiming to find the answer given by the famous Ottoman scholar Tashkubrizadah. In his three-volume work called as Miftâh al-Sa‘âdah, Tashkubrizadah sets out a very distinctive classification of ‘ulûm that have not seen before. What also attracts our attention here is that Tashkubrizadah also draws a tree symbol just like Descartes in his classification. We see this foundation in the section headings of his work. These headings also have a special importance in terms of showing the boundaries and depth of Ottoman ‘ilm tradition. (shrink)

The paper rst lays out a non-congurational approach to scope ambiguities in which scope dependencies are treated as dependencies between evaluation indices of variables. The notions of dependent and domain variables are dened naturally in this framework. These concepts are then used to account for the distribution and interpretation of determiner reduplication in Hungarian, a phenomenon that has not received much attention so far.1 1. Introduction This paper contributes to the study of the semantics of indenites in natural language by (...) introducing on the scene a new type of indenite, called dependent. We meet it in Hungarian, where one may reduplicate certain determiners, as illustrated in [1]-[3]. (shrink)

The social aspects of modern science and technology; The cultural aspects of science; The sociology of the research process; The planning of science: bernal versus polanyi.

Abstract: On several occasions (see e.g. Principles I/48) Descartes claims that sensations, emotions, imagination and sensory perceptions belong neither to the mind or to the body alone, but rather to their union. This seems to conflict with Descartes’s definition of “thought” given elsewhere, which classifies the same events as modes of a thinking substance, and hence depending for their existence only on minds. In this paper I offer an interpretation, which, I hope, will restore the coherence of Descartes’s dualist theory. (...) I argue that the ‘special modes’ of thinking are special because they are the immediate effects of the body on the mind. They thus depend for their existence on the body because of the general metaphysical principle that “Nothing comes from nothing”. Understood properly, this principle does not contradict the principle about the distinctness of substances. (shrink)

One of the main driving forces in the era of cyber-physical systems is the introduction of massive sensor networks into manufacturing processes, connected cars, precision agriculture, and so on. Therefore, large amounts of sensor data have to be ingested at the server side in order to generate and make the “twin digital model” or virtual factory of the existing physical processes for predictive simulation and scheduling purposes usable. In this paper, we focus on our ultimate goal, a novel software container-based (...) approach with cloud agnostic orchestration facilities that enable the system operators in the industry to create and manage scalable, virtual IT platforms on-demand for these two typical major pillars of CPS: server-side framework for sensor networks and configurable simulation tool for predicting the behavior of manufacturing systems. The paper discusses the scalability of the applied discrete-event simulation tool and the layered back-end framework starting from simple virtual machine-level to sophisticated multilevel autoscaling use case scenario. The presented achievements and evaluations leverage on the synergy of the existing EasySim simulator, our new CQueue software container manager, the continuously developed Occopus cloud orchestrator tool, and the latest version of the evolving MiCADO framework for integrating such tools into a unified platform. (shrink)